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domingo, 2 de janeiro de 2011

#WikiLeaks Irán bloquea el acceso a la página web de EL PAÍS


El jefe de la Guardia Revolucionaria abofeteó a Ahmadineyad en un consejo, según un cable de Wikileaks publicado hoy en este periódico

EL PAÍS 30/12/2010


Las páginas del diario EL PAÍS no se pueden ver hoy en Irán. Las autoridades iraníes han bloqueado el acceso a este diario a través de Internet después de que publicara un cable diplomático de EE UU filtrado por Wikileaks en el que se afirma que el jefe de la Guardia Revolucionaria iraní, Alí Safari, abofeteó al presidente Mahmud Ahmadineyad. Irán también ha bloqueado el acceso a otras páginas web que reproducen la noticia publicada por este diario. Además, ninguno de los medios oficiales iraníes se han hecho eco de la noticia, que no ha sido confirmada ni desmentida aún por fuentes oficiales.



En el cable de la embajada estadounidense, fechado en Bakú del 11 de febrero de 2010, el diplomático norteamericano Rob Garverick informa de las comunicaciones con una fuente iraní, cuya identidad no ha sido revelada para proteger su vida. El despacho diplomático procedente de Azerbaiyán señala que Jafari habría golpeado a Ahmadineyad durante una acalorada discusión en el Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional de enero de 2010 por las repercusiones de las controvertidas elecciones de junio de 2009. Al parecer, durante la citada reunión el mandatario iraní sorprendió al resto de los asistentes al defender una postura definida por el cable como "sorprendentemente liberal".

Ahmadineyad sostuvo, de acuerdo con la fuente iraní, que "la gente se siente asfixiada" y apostó, para hacer frente a las protestas y manifestaciones de descontento social, por una mayor permisividad y tolerancia incluida una mayor libertad de prensa". Esta versión sostiene que las consideraciones de Ahmadineyad encolerizaron al jefe de los pasdarán (Guardia Revolucionaria) quien habría exclamado "estás equivocado. Eres tú quien ha creado este caso. ¿Y encima dices que le demos más libertad a la prensa?".

El tumulto motivó la suspensión de la reunión, que nunca volvió a reanudarse, aunque dos semanas después el ayatolá Janati (presidente del Consejo de Guardianes) medió para apaciguar a Jafari y Ahmadineyad, señala el cable. Según la fuente informante, algunos blogs de Irán se habían hecho eco de la suspensión de la reunión del Consejo Supremo, pero no de los extremos del enfrentamiento.

El pasado 29 de noviembre, el presidente iraní restó importancia a los documentos filtrados por Wikileaks y dijo que simplemente se trata de una conspiración. En una rueda de prensa ofrecida en Teherán, Ahmadienyad insistió en que "no es más que un juego" y en que el gobierno iraní es "lo suficientemente inteligente como para prestarle atención". "Wikileaks no es una revelación, sino que se está publicando de modo sistemático y programado y no tiene crédito; se parece más a una guerra psicológica y no tendrá el impacto político que ellos quieren" afirmó.


El jefe de la Guardia Revolucionaria abofeteó a Ahmadineyad, según EE UU

El presidente de Irán sorprendió a los clérigos con una propuesta de apertura.- La diplomacia estadounidense asegura que su fuente es de gran fiabilidad

FRANCISCO PEREGIL - Madrid - 29/12/2010


El telegrama fue enviado hacia Washington desde Bakú el pasado febrero. Meses antes, las calles de Teherán venían llenándose de manifestantes en contra de los resultados de las elecciones de junio de 2009, en las que el presidente de Irán, Mahmud Ahmadineyad, venció al reformista Mir-Hosein Musaví. Aquel junio se saldó con 10 muertos en las calles, 100 heridos y decenas de detenidos. Al cabo de varias protestas, en diciembre ya no se pedía la repetición de las elecciones sino el final del sistema. La tensión llegó a tal extremo que el fiscal general del Estado, Gholamhosein Mohseni-Ejei, declaró el 8 de diciembre de 2009: "Se ha acabado la tolerancia. A partir de ahora, no tendremos piedad con nadie que actúe contra la seguridad nacional". Pero las protestas continuaron. Y la represión, también.


El cable emitido desde el país vecino de Azerbaiyán por la Embajada estadounidense de Bakú informaba del alboroto que se formó en una reunión del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional cuando Ahmadineyad sorprendió al resto de miembros con una "postura sorprendentemente liberal". "[Nuestra] fuente señala que Ahmadineyad afirmó que 'la gente se siente asfixiada' y concluyó que para desactivar la situación podría ser necesario permitir más libertades personales y sociales, incluida una mayor libertad de prensa".

"Según la fuente", continúa el despacho, "las afirmaciones de Ahmadineyad encolerizaron al jefe de la Guardia Revolucionaria, Alí Jafari, quien exclamó: '¡Estás equivocado! (De hecho) ¡Eres tú quien ha creado este caso! ¿Y encima dices que le demos más libertad a la prensa?' La fuente relata que Jafari abofeteó entonces a Ahmadineyad en el rostro, provocando un alboroto y una inmediata llamada para el descanso en un encuentro que nunca llegó a reanudarse. La fuente dice que el Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional no volvió a reunirse durante dos semanas, hasta que el ayatolá Janati [presidente del Consejo de Guardianes] actuó exitosamente como un 'muñidor de paz' entre Jafari y Ahmadineyad. La fuente añadió que en algunos blogs de Irán se había informado sobre el receso en la reunión del Consejo Supremo, pero no de la bofetada que lo había provocado".

Protección para el informante

El consejero Rob Garverick, redactor del informe, pidió protección para la persona que le informó sobre lo acontecido, un personaje que demostró poseer un "amplio espectro de contactos políticos y gubernamentales (con la inclusión de familiares)". "El contacto es conocido por los observadores iraníes durante un año y ha venido informando de forma precisa sobre temas políticos delicados y económicos. Su red de trabajo incluye a individuos que poseen conocimientos sobre las deliberaciones del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional".

El informante de la embajada estadounidense en Azerbaiyán indicó que tanto el presidente de Irán como el jefe de la Guardia Revolucionaria continuaron alimentando nuevas confrontaciones mediante "maniobras en varios subgrupos".

La Guardia Revolucionaria es un Ejército ideológico paralelo al regular. Alí Jafari, el hombre que supuestamente abofeteó a Ahmadineyad, cuenta con sus propias fuerzas terrestres, aéreas y navales; sus hombres están mejor equipados, reciben mejores salarios que los soldados regulares y él solo está obligado a rendir cuenta ante el líder supremo de la revolución, Alí Jameneí.

Desde que se fundó la República Islámica de Irán en 1979, la figura del líder supremo de la revolución es quien ostenta el poder real. Primero fue el Ayatolá Ruholá Jomeini el verdadero hombre fuerte del país y a su muerte le sucedió Alí Jameneí. A lo largo de 21 años, el sucesor de Jomeini se ha encargado de reforzar el peso de los Guardianes de la Revolución en el país. Fueron los milicianos basiyíes, dependientes de Alí Jafari, quienes sofocaron las revueltas de la oposición a base de golpes y denuncias.

El robo electoral

Otro confidente de la embajada comentó en Bakú a los diplomáticos estadounidenses que las elecciones de junio marcaron un antes y un después en la historia del país. En un despacho remitido a Washington tres meses después de los comicios se señala: "[El informante] explicó que antes de las elecciones muchos iraníes pensaban que, al menos, había algo de democracia en el régimen. (...) Incluso los opositores y los autodeclarados escépticos sentían que un cambio dentro del sistema sería posible. Pero, según la fuente, el descaro del robo en las elecciones y el periodo posterior de cinismo y represión fueron 'una bofetada en el rostro' que destruyeron ese punto de vista".

Otro punto de inflexión en la historia del país, según el citado confidente, fue el momento en el que el líder supremo se pronunció en público a favor de Ahmadineyad el 19 de junio, cuando se cuestionaba el resultado de las elecciones. El ayatolá Jameneí calificó entonces la "victoria" de Ahmadineyad como "divinamente inspirada". Aquel acto hizo saltar por los aires la imagen del líder supremo como "un árbitro independiente y honesto" y pasó a ser considerado "un político intrigante y embustero como tantos", según informó la fuente de los diplomáticos.

El informe sobre la bofetada fue redactado el pasado 11 de febrero. En aquellas fechas, el confidente auguraba que las cosas irían "de mal en peor" en su país. "Opinó que la situación (de protestas e inestabilidad) no podía sostenerse indefinidamente y predijo que los acontecimientos tenderían hacia un mayor desarrollo y una nueva fase".

Cuando le preguntaron que cómo creía él que se encontraría su país el año próximo contestó: "Pregúntenme después del 11 de febrero". El despacho no señala que ese era el día en que se cumplía el 31º aniversario de la revolución islámica y por tanto, el aniversario de las revueltas que provocaron la caída del sah. Pero días antes de la conmemoración el régimen detuvo a decenas de estudiantes y periodistas próximos a la oposición. Y el 11 de febrero las protestas solo se dejaron oír en Internet. El líder supremo declaró: "[Ha sido] una lección para los enemigos internos y una decepción para quienes pretenden representar al pueblo". Vencieron los Guardianes de la Revolución.



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#WikiLeaks EE UU no dio 'luz verde' a Sadam Husein para que invadiera Kuwait


El presidente iraquí, desesperado por la ruina del país tras la guerra con Irán

ÁNGELES ESPINOSA - Madrid - 01/01/2011



¿Dio Estados Unidos luz verde a la invasión iraquí de Kuwait en el verano de 1990? Es lo que sugirieron entonces algunos medios árabes. Se basaban en una filtración iraquí del diálogo que mantuvieron el presidente Sadam Husein y la embajadora norteamericana April Glaspie una semana antes de que las tropas iraquíes cruzaran la frontera del emirato. Los despachos diplomáticos a los que ha tenido acceso EL PAÍS desmienten esa eventualidad. Aunque aparece la frase en la que se apoyó aquella interpretación ("no tomamos partido ante estos asuntos árabes"), se refiere a la delimitación de la frontera y no al enfrentamiento por el precio del petróleo que inflamó el conflicto entre Bagdad y Kuwait. El resumen que Glaspie hace de la audiencia transmite una gran preocupación de Washington por la tensión regional, y refleja a un Sadam desesperado ante la ruina económica en que ha quedado su país tras la guerra con Irán (1980-1988) y que se siente traicionado por sus vecinos (documento 372).




"Irak sufre y Kuwait se comporta de manera mezquina", asegura Sadam

"Ustedes quieren que baje el precio del petróleo", dice el dictador a EE UU

Sadam convoca a la embajadora estadounidense a mediodía del 25 de julio de 1990, un hecho inusual, según explica ella misma en el telegrama que envía a Washington. "Hasta donde alcanza la memoria del actual cuerpo diplomático, Sadam nunca ha convocado a un embajador. Está preocupado", interpreta Glaspie. Mucho más que preocupado si nos atenemos a su relato.

"Irak, subraya el presidente, se encuentra en graves dificultades financieras, con deudas de 40.000 millones de dólares", escribe Glaspie. No es solo cuestión de dinero. Sadam defiende que su país, "cuya victoria en la guerra contra Irán supuso una diferencia histórica para el Mundo Árabe y Occidente, necesita un plan Marshall". Sin embargo, se queja a la embajadora: "Ustedes quieren que baje el precio del petróleo". Y ahí radica la esencia del problema, tal como reveló el propio líder iraquí dos meses antes durante la cumbre árabe de la que fue anfitrión.

Frustración de Sadam

Las notas que esta corresponsal guarda de aquella cita recogen ya la frustración de Sadam ante la falta de solidaridad de sus vecinos kuwaitíes y emiratíes una vez que Bagdad aplacó al Irán revolucionario. Sus principales acreedores, Arabia Saudí y Kuwait, se niegan a perdonarle la deuda. Además, Bagdad acusa a Kuwait de estar extrayendo más crudo del pactado en la OPEC, lo que presiona a la baja el precio del petróleo y daña la economía iraquí. El dirigente iraquí se siente traicionado.

"Irak, que ha tenido cientos de miles de víctimas, está sufriendo, y Kuwait se comporta [de forma] 'mezquina y egoista'", se queja el presidente, que además sospecha que el Gobierno de EE UU está utilizando a Kuwait y Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) como "puntas de lanza" porque le interesa un combustible barato. "Quienes fuerzan los precios del petróleo a la baja están entablando una guerra económica e Irak no puede aceptar semejante violación a su dignidad y prosperidad", advierte Sadam. "Igual que Irak no amenazará a otros, tampoco aceptará ninguna amenaza en su contra", añade dando a entender que se cree víctima de un complot.

Al concluir la guerra entre Irán e Irak, Sadam espera reconocimiento por haber contenido la expansión iraní. Sin embargo, se encuentra con que ahora es su régimen el que provoca recelos entre los árabes.

Toma de posición "flagrante" contra Irak

"Esperamos que el Gobierno de EE UU no nos malinterprete", pide Sadam a Glaspie. "Irak acepta, como dijo el portavoz del Departamento de Estado, que cada país puede elegir a sus amigos. Pero el Gobierno de EE UU sabe que fue Irak, y no el Gobierno de EE UU, el que protegió decisivamente a esos amigos del Gobierno de EE UU durante la guerra, lo cual es comprensible dado que la opinión pública de EE UU (...) hubiera hecho imposible para los estadounidenses aceptar 10.000 muertos en una sola batalla, como hizo Irak".

El presidente iraquí ve el compromiso de Washington con la defensa de sus amigos del golfo Pérsico como "una toma de posición flagrante en contra del Gobierno de Irak". También denuncia que sus "maniobras [militares] con EAU y Kuwait (sic) les animan en sus políticas poco generosas". Se queja de que EE UU dice querer paz, pero le "aprieta las tuercas", y subraya que "Irak tendrá que responder si EE UU sigue usando esos métodos".

"¿Cómo podemos hacerles entender [a Kuwait y EAU] cuánto estamos sufriendo?", se pregunta Sadam. "Créame, lo he intentado todo: hemos despachado enviados, escrito mensajes y pedido [al rey saudí] Fahd que organice una cumbre cuatripartita", trata de convencer a la embajadora. El presidente le recuerda que los iraquíes saben lo que es la guerra y no quieren volver a sufrirla. "No nos empujen a ella, no la conviertan en la única opción con la que podamos proteger nuestra dignidad", casi implora tras haber dejado claro que "Irak sabe que el Gobierno de EE UU puede enviar aviones y cohetes, y dañarle gravemente".

Preocupación estadounidense

Glaspie no parece malinterpretar a Sadam. Le expresa la preocupación de su Gobierno por las agresivas declaraciones de los altos cargos iraquíes. "¿No es razonable que nos preocupemos cuando el presidente y el ministro de Exteriores dicen en público que las acciones kuwaitíes equivalen a una agresión militar, y a continuación nos enteramos del envío a la frontera de numerosas unidades de la Guardia Republicana? ¿No es razonable que preguntemos, con espíritu amigable y no de enfrentamiento, cuáles son sus intenciones?", plantea. Dos días antes, un informe de la CIA ha advertido de que Irak ha desplazado 30.000 tropas a la linde con Kuwait. La V flota estadounidense, con base en el golfo Pérsico, se ha puesto en alerta.

La embajadora asegura en el telegrama haber dejado claro que EE UU nunca podrá "aceptar el arreglo de los conflictos más que por medios pacíficos". La famosa frase fuera de contexto que parece dar luz verde a la invasión solo aparece en una nota final. Sadam menciona el acuerdo de 1961 por el que Irak y Kuwait establecieron "una línea de patrulla" para su frontera pendiente de delimitar. Los kuwaitíes acusan a los iraquíes de haberse adentrado 20 kilómetros más allá. Glaspie, que recuerda que 20 años antes ha estado destinada en el emirato, señala: "Entonces, como ahora, no tomamos partido en estos asuntos árabes".

Si a pesar de la angustia que transmite Sadam, la embajadora no da la señal de alarma sobre el riesgo de una acción a la desesperada es porque el propio líder iraquí le informa de una mediación de Hosni Mubarak. De hecho, Sadam interrumpe la audiencia para atender la llamada urgente del presidente egipcio. Hosni Mubarak ha organizado una reunión entre iraquíes y kuwaitíes en Riad, la capital saudí, tras la cual "el 28, el 29 o el 30 de julio, el príncipe heredero de Kuwait viajará a Bagdad para las negociaciones en serio", escribe Glaspie. "Le he dicho a Mubarak que no pasará nada hasta entonces", cuenta que le dijo Sadam.

La reunión se celebra finalmente en Yeddah el 31 de julio y no consigue desbloquear la crisis. Tampoco el heredero kuwaití viaja a Bagdad. Sadam invade Kuwait durante la noche del 1 al 2 de agosto. Esa mañana la embajada estadounidense no logra comunicar con ninguno de sus interlocutores en el Ministerio de Exteriores iraquí. Ni el titular, Tarek Aziz, ni el vicesecretario Saad Hamdun, responden al teléfono. "Hemos intentado repetidamente desde las 6.30 (...) y se lo estamos recordando cada diez minutos. A las 7.10 nos dicen que ambos están en una reunión", escribe el oficial de comunicaciones Charles Wilson (documento 379) . La Embajada ha formado un equipo de crisis y la prensa iraquí no hace ninguna mención a la invasión, añade el telegrama.


Cable con un mensaje de amistad de Sadam al presidente Bush

La embajadora Glaspie conversa con Sadam Husein una semana antes de la invasión iraquí de Kuwait y narra que le ha transmitido la preocupación estadounidense por las declaraciones amenazantes hacia el emirato

01/01/2011



ID:372
Date:1990-07-25 12:46:00
Origin:90BAGHDAD4237
Source:Embassy Baghdad
Classification:SECRET
Dunno:90KUWAIT20
Destination:O 251246Z JUL 90
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4627
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
ARABLEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 04237

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, US, KU, IZ
SUBJECT: SADDAM'S MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP TO PRESIDENT BUSH

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SADDAM TOLD THE AMBASSADOR JULY 25
THAT MUBARAK HAS ARRANGED FOR KUWAITI AND IRAQI
DELEGATIONS TO MEET IN RIYADH, AND THEN ON
JULY 28, 29 OR 30, THE KUWAITI CROWN PRINCE WILL
COME TO BAGHDAD FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. "NOTHING
WILL HAPPEN" BEFORE THEN, SADDAM HAD PROMISED
MUBARAK.

--SADDAM WISHED TO CONVEY AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT BUSH: IRAQ WANTS FRIENDSHIP, BUT DOES
THE USG? IRAQ SUFFERED 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES
AND IS NOW SO POOR THAT WAR ORPHAN PENSIONS WILL
SOON BE CUT; YET RICH KUWAIT WILL NOT EVEN ACCEPT
OPEC DISCIPLINE. IRAQ IS SICK OF WAR, BUT KUWAIT
HAS IGNORED DIPLOMACY. USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE
WILL ENCOURAGE THE UAE AND KUWAIT TO IGNORE
CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY. IF IRAQ IS PUBLICLY
HUMILIATED BY THE USG, IT WILL HAVE NO CHOICE
BUT TO "RESPOND," HOWEVER ILLOGICAL AND SELF
DESTRUCTIVE THAT WOULD PROVE.

--ALTHOUGH NOT QUITE EXPLICIT, SADDAM'S MESSAGE
TO US SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WILL MAKE A MAJOR PUSH
TO COOPERATE WITH MUBARAK'S DIPLOMACY, BUT WE MUST
TRY TO UNDERSTAND KUWAITI/UAE "SELFISHNESS" IS
UNBEARABLE. AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT WE CAN
NEVER EXCUSE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY OTHER THAN
PEACEFUL MEANS. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR WAS SUMMONED BY PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSAYN AT NOON JULY 25. ALSO PRESENT
WERE FONMIN AZIZ, THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
DIRECTOR, TWO NOTETAKERS, AND THE IRAQI
INTERPRETER.

4. SADDAM, WHOSE MANNER WAS CORDIAL,
REASONABLE AND EVEN WARM THROUGHOUT THE ENSUING
TWO HOURS, SAID HE WISHED THE AMBASSADOR TO
CONVEY A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BUSH. SADDAM
THEN RECALLED IN DETAIL THE HISTORY OF IRAQ'S
DECISION TO REESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
AND ITS POSTPONING IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT
DECISION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, RATHER THAN BE
THOUGHT WEAK AND NEEDY. HE THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE
MANY "BLOWS" OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO
SINCE 1984, CHIEF AMONG THEM IRANGATE. IT WAS
AFTER THE FAW VICTORY, SADDAM SAID, THAT IRAQI
MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT USG PURPOSES BEGAN TO
SURFACE AGAIN, I.E., SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS
NOT HAPPY TO SEE THE WAR END.

5. PICKING HIS WORDS WITH CARE, SADDAM SAID
THAT THERE ARE "SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG,
INCLUDING IN CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT,
BUT EMPHATICALLY EXCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY BAKER, WHO ARE NOT FRIENDLY TOWARD
IRAQ-U.S. RELATIONS. HE THEN LISTED WHAT HE
SEEMED TO REGARD AS FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS
CONCLUSION: "SOME CIRCLES ARE GATHERING
INFORMATION ON WHO MIGHT BE SADDAM HUSAYN'S
SUCCESSOR;" THEY KEPT UP CONTACTS IN THE GULF
WARNING AGAINST IRAQ; THEY WORKED TO ENSURE
NO HELP WOULD GO TO IRAQ (READ EXIM AND CCC).

6. IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, IS IN SERIOUS
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, WITH 40 BILLION USD DEBTS.
IRAQ, WHOSE VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAN
MADE AN HISTORIC DIFFERENCE TO THE ARAB WORLD
AND THE WEST, NEEDS A MARSHALL PLAN. BUT "YOU
WANT THE OIL PRICE DOWN," SADDAM CHARGED.

7. RESUMING HIS LIST OF GRIEVANCES WHICH HE
BELIEVED WERE ALL INSPIRED BY
"SOME CIRCLES" IN THE USG, HE RECALLED THE
"USIA CAMPAIGN" AGAINST HIMSELF, AND THE
GENERAL MEDIA ASSAULT ON IRAQ AND ITS PRESIDENT.

8. DESPITE ALL THESE BLOWS, SADDAM SAID, AND
ALTHOUGH "WE WERE SOMEWHAT ANNOYED," WE STILL
HOPED THAT WE COULD DEVELOP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP.
BUT THOSE WHO FORCE OIL PRICES DOWN ARE ENGAGING
IN ECONOMIC WARFARE AND IRAQ CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH
A TRESPASS ON ITS DIGNITY AND PROSPERITY.

9. THE SPEARHEADS (FOR THE USG) HAVE BEEN KUWAIT
AND THE UAE, SADDAM SAID. SADDAM SAID CAREFULLY
THAT JUST AS IRAQ WILL NOT THREATEN OTHERS, IT
WILL ACCEPT NO THREAT AGAINST ITSELF. "WE HOPE
THE USG WILL NOT MISUNDERSTAND:" IRAQ ACCEPTS,
AS THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, THAT ANY
COUNTRY MAY CHOOSE ITS FRIENDS. BUT THE USG KNOWS
THAT IT WAS IRAQ, NOT THE USG, WHICH DECISIVELY
PROTECTED THOSE USG FRIENDS DURING THE WAR--AND THAT
IS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USG,
TO SAY NOTHING OF GEOGRAPHY, WOULD HAVE MADE IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT 10,000 DEAD
IN A SINGLE BATTLE, AS IRAQ DID.

10. SADDAM ASKED WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE USG
TO ANNOUNCE IT IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF
ITS FRIENDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY.
ANSWERING HIS OWN QUESTION, HE SAID THAT TO IRAQ
IT MEANS FLAGRANT BIAS AGAINST THE GOI.

11. COMING TO ONE OF HIS MAIN POINTS, SADDAM
ARGUED THAT USG MANEUVERS WITH THE UAE AND KUWAIT (SIC)
ENCOURAGED THEM IN THEIR UNGENEROUS POLICIES. THE
IRAQI RIGHTS, SADDAM EMPHASIZED, WILL BE RESTORED
ONE BY ONE, THOUGH IT MAY TAKE A MONTH OR MUCH
MORE THAN A YEAR. IRAQ HOPES THE USG WILL BE
IN HARMONY WITH ALL THE PARTIES TO THIS DISPUTE.

12. SADDAM SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE USG IS
DETERMINED TO KEEP THE OIL FLOWING AND TO
MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDSHIPS IN THE GULF. WHAT HE
CANNOT UNDERSTAND IS WHY WE ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO
ARE DAMAGING IRAQ, WHICH IS WHAT OUR GULF MANEUVERS
WILL DO.

13. SADDAM SAID HE FULLY BELIEVES THE USG WANTS
PEACE, AND THAT IS GOOD. BUT DO NOT, HE ASKED,
USE METHODS WHICH YOU SAY YOU DO NOT LIKE,
METHODS LIKE ARM-TWISTING-

14. AT THIS POINT SADDAM SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT
PRIDE OF IRAQIS, WHO BELIEVE IN "LIBERTY OR DEATH."
IRAQ WILL HAVE TO RESPOND IF THE U.S. USES THESE
METHODS. IRAQ KNOWS THE USG CAN SEND PLANES AND
ROCKETS AND HURT IRAQ DEEPLY. SADDAM ASKS THAT
THE USG NOT FORCE IRAQ TO THE POINT OF HUMILIATION
AT WHICH LOGIC MUST BE DISREGARDED. IRAQ DOES NOT
CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ENEMY AND HAS TRIED TO BE
FRIENDS.

15. AS FOR THE INTRA-ARAB DISPUTES, SADDAM SAID
HE IS NOT ASKING THE USG TO TAKE UP ANY PARTICULAR
ROLE SINCE THE SOLUTIONS MUST COME THROUGH ARAB
AND BILATERAL DIPLOMACY.

16. RETURNING TO HIS THEME THAT IRAQ WANTS
DIGNITY AND FREEDOM AS WELL AS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE
U.S., HE CHARGED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR THERE WERE
MANY OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WHICH MADE IT SEEM THAT
THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT TO RECIPROCATE. HOW, FOR
EXAMPLE, SADDAM ASKED,CAN WE INTERPRET THE
INVITATION FOR ARENS TO VISIT AT A TIME OF CRISIS
IN THE GULF? WHY DID THE U.S- DEFENSE MINISTER
MAKE "INFLAMMATORY" STATEMENTS?

17. SADDAM SAID THAT THE IRAQIS KNOW WHAT
WAR IS, WANT NO MORE OF IT--"DO NOT PUSH US TO IT;
DO NOT MAKE IT THE ONLY OPTION LEFT WITH WHICH WE
CAN PROTECT OUR DIGNITY."

18. PRESIDENT BUSH, SADDAM SAID, HAS MADE NO MISTAKE
IN HIS PRESIDENCY VIS-A-VIS THE ARABS. THE DECISION
ON THE PLO DIALOGUE WAS "MISTAKEN," BUT IT WAS
TAKEN UNDER "ZIONIST PRESSURE" AND, SADDAM SAID, IS
PERHAPS A CLEVER TACTIC TO ABSORB THAT PRESSURE.

19. AFTER A SHORT DIVERSION ON THE NEED FOR THE
U.S. TO CONSIDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 200,000
ARABS WITH THE SAME VIGOR AND INTEREST AS THE HUMAN
RIGHTS OF THE ISRAELIS, SADDAM CONCLUDED BY
RESTATING THAT IRAQ WANTS AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP
"ALTHOUGH WE WILL NOT PANT FOR IT, WE WILL DO OUR
PART AS FRIENDS."

20. SADDAM THEN OFFERED AN ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE
HIS POINT. HE HAD TOLD THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER
IN 1974 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE UP HALF OF
THE SHATT AL-ARAB TO IRAN TO OBTAIN ALL OF A
PROSPEROUS IRAQ. THE KURD HAD BET THAT SADDAM WOULD
NOT GIVE HALF THE SHATT--THE KURD WAS WRONG. EVEN
NOW, THE ONLY REAL ISSUE WITH IRAN IS THE SHATT, AND
IF GIVING AWAY HALF OF THE WATERWAY IS THE ONLY
THING STANDING BETWEEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AND
IRAQI PROSPERITY, SADDAM SAID HE WOULD BE GUIDED
BY WHAT HE DID IN 1974.

21. THE AMBASSADOR THANKED SADDAM FOR THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH HIM SOME OF
HIS AND OUR CONCERNS. PRESIDENT BUSH, TOO, WANTS
FRIENDSHIP, AS HE HAD WRITTEN AT THE 'ID AND ON
THE OCCASION OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL DAY. SADDAM
INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE HAD BEEN TOUCHED BY THOSE

22. AMBASSADOR RESUMED HER THEME, RECALLING THAT
THE PRESIDENT HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO BROADEN AND
DEEPEN OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. SADDAM HAD REFERRED
TO "SOME CIRCLES" ANTIPATHETIC TO THAT AIM. SUCH
CIRCLES CERTAINLY EXISTED, BUT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION
IS INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONTROL THE AMERICAN PRESS;
IF HE DID, CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT
EXIST. SADDAM AGAIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY HE UNDERSTOOD
THAT. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE HAD SEEN THE DIANE
SAWYER SHOW AND THOUGHT THAT IT WAS CHEP AND UNFAIR.
BUT THE AMERICAN PRESS TREATS ALL POLITICIANS
WITHOUT KID GLOVES--THAT IS OUR WAY.

23. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS
VERY RECENTLY REAFFIRMED HIS DESIRE FOR A BETTER
RELATIONSHIP AND HAS PROVEN THAT BY, FOR EXAMPLE,
OPPOSING SANCTIONS BILLS. HERE SADDAM INTERRUPTED
AGAIN. LAUGHING, HE SAID THERE IS NOTHING LEFT
FOR IRAQ TO BUY IN THE U.S. EVERYTHING IS
PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR WHEAT, AND NO DOUBT THAT WILL
SOON BE DECLARED A DUAL-USE ITEM- SADDAM SAID, HOWEVER,
HE HAD DECIDED NOT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE, BUT RATHER
CONCENTRATE ON THE FAR MORE IMPORTANT ISSUES AT HAND.

24. AMBASSADOR SAID THERE WERE MANY ISSUES HE
HAD RAISED SHE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON, BUT
SHE WISHED TO USE HER LIMITED TIME WITH THE
PRESIDENT TO STRESS FIRST PRESIDENT BUSH'S DESIRE
FOR FRIENDSHIP AND, SECOND, HIS STRONG DESIRE, SHARED
WE ASSUME BY IRAQ, FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MID
EAST. IS IT NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO BE CONCERNED
WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH
SAY PUBLICLY THAT KUWAITI ACTIONS ARE THE
EQUIVALENT OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, AND THEN WE
LEARN THAT MANY UNITS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD
HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE BORDER? IS IT NOT REASONABLE
FOR US TO ASK, IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, NOT
CONFRONTATION, THE SIMPLE QUESTION: WHAT ARE YOUR
INTENTIONS?

25. SADDAM SAID THAT WAS INDEED A REASONABLE
QUESTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE SHOULD BE
CONCERNED FOR REGIONAL PEACE, IN FACT IT IS OUR
DUTY AS A SUPERPOWER. "BUT HOW CAN WE MAKE THEM
(KUWAIT AND UAE) UNDERSTAND HOW DEEPLY WE ARE
SUFFERING." THE FINANCIAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT
THE PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WILL HAVE
TO BE CUT. AT THIS POINT, THE INTERPRETER AND
ONE OF THE NOTETAKERS BROKE DOWN AND WEPT.

26. AFTER A PAUSE FOR RECUPERATION, SADDAM SAID,
IN EFFECT, BELIEVE ME I HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING: WE
SENT ENVOYS, WROTE MESSAGES, ASKED FAHD TO
ARRANGE QUADRAPARTITE SUMMIT (IRAQ, SAG, UE,
KUWAIT). FAHD SUGGESTFD OIL MINISTERS INSTEAD AND
WE AGREED TO THE JEDDAH AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT WAS
WELL BELOW OUR HOPES. THEN, SADDAM CONTINUED,
TWO DAYS LATER THE KUWAITI OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCED
HE WOULD WANT TO ANNUL THAT AGREEMENT WITHIN TWO
MONTHS. AS FOR THE UAE, SADDAM SAID, I BEGGED
SHAYKH ZAYID TO UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS (WHEN
SADDAM ENTERTAINED HIM IN MOSUL AFTER THE BAGHDAD
SUMMIT), AND ZAYID SAID JUST WAIT UNTIL I GET
BACK TO ABU DHABI. BUT THEN HIS MINISTER OF OIL
MADE "BAD STATEMENTS."

27. AT THIS POINT, SADDAM LEFT THE ROOM TO TAKE
AN URGENT CALL FROM MUBARAK. AFTER HIS RETURN,
THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF HE COULD TELL HER IF
THERE HAS ANY PROGRESS IN FINDING A PEACEFUL WAY
TO DEFUSE THE DISPUTE. THIS WAS SOMETHING PRESIDENT
BUSH WOULD BE KEENLY INTERESTED TO KNOW. SADDAM
SAID THAT HE HAD JUST LEARNED FROM MUBARAK THE
KUWAITIS HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE. THE KUWAITI
CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER WOULD MEET IN RIYADH
WITH SADDAM'S NUMBER TWO, IZZAT IBRAHIM, AND THEN
THE KUWAITI WOULD COME TO BAGHDAD ON SATURDAY,
SUNDAY OR, AT THE LATEST, MONDAY, JULY 30.

28. "I TOLD MUBARAK," SADDAM SAID, THAT "NOTHING
WILL HAPPEN UNTIL THE MEETING," AND NOTHING WILL
HAPPEN DURING OR AFTER THE MEETING IF THE KUWAITIS
WILL AT LAST "GIVE US SOME HOPE."

29. THE AMBASSADOR SAID SHE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR
THIS GOOD NEWS. SADDAM THEN ASKED HER TO CONVEY
HIS WARM GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT BUSH AND TO
CONVEY HIS MESSAGE TO HIM.

30. NOTE: ON THE BORDER QUESTION, SADDAM REFERRED
TO THE 1961 AGREEMENT AND A "LINE OF PATROL" IT
HAD ESTABLISHED. THE KUWAITIS, HE SAID, HAD TOLD
MUBARAK IRAQ WAS 20 KILOMETERS "IN FRONT" OF THIS
LINE. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT SHE HAD SERVED IN
KUWAIT 20 YEARS BEFORE; THEN, AS NOW, WE TOOK NO
POSITION ON THESE ARAB AFFAIRS.

31. COMMENT: IN THE MEMORY QF THE CURRENT
DIPLOMATIC CORPS, SADDAM HAS NEVER SUMMONED AN
AMBASSADOR. HE IS WORRIED.

ACCORDING TO HIS OWN POLITICAL THEORIZING
(U.S. THE SOLE MAJOR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST),
HE NEEDS AT A MINIMUM A CORRECT RELATIONSHIP
WITH US FOR OBVIOUS GEOPOLITICAL REASONS,
ESPECIALLY AS LONG AS HE PERCEIVES MORTAL
THREATS FROM ISRAEL AND IRAN. AMBASSADOR
BELIEVES SADDAM SUSPECTS OUR DECISION SUDDENLY
TO UNDERTAKE MANEUVERS WITH ABU DHABI IS A
HARBINGER OF A USG DECISION TO TAKE SIDES.
FURTHER, SADDAM, HIMSELF BEGINNING TO HAVE AN
INKLING OF HOW MUCH HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ABOUT
THE U.S., IS APPREHENSIVE THAT WE DO NOT
UNDERSTAND CERTAIN POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH
INHIBIT HIM, SUCH AS:

--HE CANNOT ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE PERCEIVED AS
CAVING IN TO SUPERPOWER BULLYING (AS U/S HAMDUN
FRANKLY WARNED US IN LATE 1988);

--IRAQ, WHICH LOST 100,000'S OF CASUALTIES, IS
SUFFERING AND KUWAIT IS "MISERLY" AND "SELFISH."

32. IT WAS PROGRESS TO HAVE SADDAM ADMIT
THAT THE USG HAS A "RESPONSIBILITY" IN THE
REGION, AND HAS EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT AN
ANSWER WHEN WE ASK IRAQ'S INTENTIONS. HIS
RESPONSE IN EFFECT THAT HE TRIED VARIOUS
DIPLOMATIC/CHANNELS BEFORE RESORTING TO
UNADULTERATED INTIMIDATION HAS AT LEAST THE
VIRTUE OF FRANKNESS. HIS EMPHASIS THAT HE
WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS SURELY SINCERE
(IRAQIS ARE SICK OF WAR), BUT THE TERMS SOUND
DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. SADDAM SEEMS TO WANT
PLEDGES NOW ON OIL PRICES AND PRODUCTION TO
COVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.



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O símbolo olímpico


Achei belo, belíssimo, o símbolo do Rio-2016.

Se for plágio de Matisse, será lamentável.

Se for apenas uma citaçāo, algo absolutamente normal, nāo custava nada ter mencionado.

Mas pode ter sido apenas uma coincidência, uma traição do subconsciente, coisas que acontecem.

Porque é improvável que o artista tenha sido contaminado pelo espírito do COB.


Juca Kfouri é formado em Ciências Sociais pela USP. Desde 2005, é colunista da Folha de S.Paulo e do UOL.

http://www.tatil.com.br/

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Tarso Fernando Herz Genro e Cesare Battisti "Misericórdia a um assassino terrorista"

Como sabem os leitores deste blog eu sou plenamente favorável à revisão dos crimes praticados pelos agentes do Estado durante a ditadura militar. Os crimes praticados pelos opositores que pegaram em armas foram apurados e seus autores punidos com a tortura, a prisão, o exílio e até a morte e o desaparecimento. Já os crimes praticados pelos "assassinos da pátria" mal vieram à tona e a grande maioria sequer chegou aos tribunais. Por isso mesmo sou a favor da extradição de Cesare Battisti, para que seus crimes sejam julgados no país onde foram praticados, e não no Brasil. Nesse sentido apoio o artigo do coronel Milton, enviado ao blog.

Por Milton Corrêa da Costa*, especial para o blog Repórter de Crime

A esquerda brasileira, mormente os saudosistas da luta armada, encerra o ano de 2010 em festa. Ao apagar da luzes de seu governo o presidente Lula decide, sob o argumento do refúgio político, pelo não acatamento do pedido de extradição de Cesare Battisti, um homicida terrorista, condenado por quatro homicídios pela justiça italiana em pleno estado de direito. Ou seja um homicida, condenado num país soberano, em que se é desconsiderada uma decisão judicial. O entendimento brasileiro é de crimes conexos a crimes políticos.
Ainda que a decisão seja de competência exclusiva do governo brasileiro e baseada numa brecha do Tratado de Extradição, firmado entre os dois páises (Decreto 863 de 09/07/93), tal decisão, como frisou o Ministro da Defesa da Itália, é "injusta e gravemente ofensiva" ao povo italiano, pois fere direitos humanos das vítimas e afronta seus familiarares. Battisti foi condenado a 30 anos de prisão pela justiça italiana. Não importa se os assassinatos que o refugiado nega ter cometido foram ou não cometidos por ideologia política. A luta armada, objetivando a tomada pela via ilegal do poder, não concede direitos a nenhum ativista de eliminar fisicamente o opositor político. Nem aos opositores torturar os ativistas revolucionários. Isso é fato. Registre-se que no Brasil optou-se pela anistia para ambos os lados.

Estranha-se inclusive que a lamentável decisão tenha sido tomada no último dia de um governo, como se quisesse fazer com que, na véspera da posse da nova presidente e das festas de réveillon, houvesse pouca repercussão. Ledo engano. Caracteriza-se -se o Brasil, com tal perigosa decisão, perante o cenário mundial, como o novo paraíso de assassinos terroristas. como já se não bastasse ser o país do direito penal mínimo, onde criminosos, cometam o crime que cometerem, são beneficiados por progressões de regime, visitas íntimas, saídas para visita ao lar, ociosidadae no cárcere, etc, etc, Dois pesos e duas medidas com relação ao caso dos dois lutadores de boxe que durante o Pan tentaram fugir da ditadura cubana e foram imediatamente devolvidos ao "companheiro Fidel".

Fica o país aberto e receptivo aos terroristas do mundo, inclusive os do ETA, FARC e Al Qaeda, para que aqui também se refugiem sob o argumento de crimes conexos a crimes pólíticos. Profundamente lamentável como último ato decisório de um governo que preferiu manter relações diplomáticas de cordialidade como o Irã, Cuba e Venezuela e se afastar agora da eternamente amiga Itália. A ideologia venceu a diplomacia.

Milton Corrêa da Costa é coronel da PM do Rio na reserva


Cesare Battisti (1954)

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Cesare Battisti

Battisti, Nov. 17, 2009
Born December 18, 1954 (1954-12-18) (age 56)
Sermoneta, Italy
Charge(s) Two murders and accomplice in other two
Penalty Life imprisonment
Status Obtained political refugee status from Brazilian Justice Minister Tarso Genro, on 18 november 2009, the Brazilian Supreme Court considers Battisti's refugee status illegal and allows extradition.
Occupation Writer

Cesare Battisti (born 18 December 1954) is a former member of the Armed Proletarians for Communism (Proletari Armati per il Comunismo - PAC), a far-left militant group which supported violent revolution during the period known as "anni di piombo". He later became a fiction author, writing 15 books.

Battisti was first sentenced to 12 years under the charge of participating in an armed group. He fled to France, where he received protection under the Mitterrand doctrine. Later he was tried in absentia based on testimony in Pietro Mutti's trial implicating him in four assassinations, bringing the total of charges against him to 36. He was given a sentence of life in prison. After the de facto repeal of the Mitterrand doctrine in 2002, Battisti fled to Brazil to avoid a possible extradition.

He was arrested in Rio de Janeiro on 18 March 2007 by Brazilian and French police officers. Later, Brazilian Minister of Justice Tarso Genro granted him the status of political refugee, in a controversial decision which was much criticized in Italy, whereas divided Brazilian and international press opinion.[1][2][3][4][5][6] On 5 February 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of Italy[7] and held a minute of silence in memory to Battisti's victims. On 18 November 2009, the Brazilian Supreme Court considered the refugee status illegal and allowed extradition, but also stated that the Brazilian constitution gives the president personal powers to deny the extradition if he chooses to, effectively putting the final decision in the hands of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. At December 31, 2010, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's last effective day as president, the decision of not allowing extradition was officially announced.

Contents

[hide]

[edit] Youth and PAC membership

Cesare Battisti was born in 1954 at Sermoneta, near Latina. He left the classical lyceum he was attending in 1971, engaged in petty crime, and then moved on to more serious offenses.[8]

In 1976 he moved to Milan, and took part in activities of the PAC, an autonomist Marxist group which conducted armed struggle, and which had a "horizontal", decentralized structure, opposed to the centralist organisation of the Red Brigades (BR). The organisation, which counted approximatively 60 members, had its roots in a district in southern Milan, called Barona. Four assassinations were committed by the PAC: Antonio Santoro, a prison guard accused by the PAC of mistreatment of prisoners (on June 6, 1978 in Udine), jeweler Pierluigi Torregiani (on February 16, 1979 in Milan), Lino Sabadin, a butcher (on the same date, near Mestre), and DIGOS agent Andrea Campagna, who had participated in the first arrests in the Torregiani case (on April 19, 1979 in Milan). The PAC also engaged in several robberies[citation needed].

The murder of Torregiani and Sabbadin had been decided by the PAC because both of them had killed a robber in the past, thus as an act of armed opposition to self-defense by attacked persons.[9] Torregiani was killed in front of his 13-year-old son, who was also shot. The son survived and is now paraplegic. The matter of who shot Torregiani's son is still debated: the media reported that he was shot by the attackers, whereas some sources, including the writer Valerio Evangelisti, maintain that he was shot by his father in a tragic error.[10] The paraplegic Torregiani considers now that, in any case, Battisti is responsible for the shooting, and should serve his sentence in jail: "It's not about the person of Cesare Battisti - he declared to the national press agency ANSA - It's in order that everyone understands that, sooner or later, those who have committed such serious crimes should pay for their faults".[11]

Cesare Battisti has stated in several texts that he abandoned political violence after Prime Minister Aldo Moro's kidnapping and subsequent murder in May 1978, carried out by the Second Red Brigades led by Mario Moretti.

[edit] First trial and escape

Cesare Battisti was arrested and jailed in Italy on February 26, 1979, sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison for participation in an "armed group" ("partecipazione a banda armata"). He was sentenced on the ground of material evidence[12]and testimonies provided by two "collaboratori di giustizia" (defendants who testified against their former accomplice) who benefitted from lighter condemnations for their testimony.[13] The status of "collaboratore di giustizia", also popularly known as pentito, was established by anti-terrorist legislation enacted during this period.

PAC members organised his escape on October 4, 1981, while he was in Frosinone prison. Battisti fled to Paris, and then for Puerto Escondido, Oaxaca, Mexico, very shortly afterward. While in Mexico, he founded a literary review Via Libre, which is still active.[14] He also participated in the creation of the Book Festival of Managua (Nicaragua), and organised the first Graphic Arts Biennal in Mexico. Cesare Battisti began to write at the suggestion of Paco Ignacio Taibo II, and collaborated with various newspapers.

[edit] Second trial

Pietro Mutti, one of the leaders of the PAC who had been sentenced in absentia for the assassination of prison surveillant Santoro, was arrested in 1982. He sought the status of "collaboratore di giustizia" and his testimony, which helped him reduce his sentence, implicated Battisti (and an alleged accomplice) , in the four assassinations claimed by the PAC. Battisti's trial was thus reopened in 1987, and he was sentenced in absentia in 1988 for two assassinations (Santoro and DIGOS agent Campagna) and complicity of murder in the two other (jeweler Torregiani and butcher Sabbadin). The court sentenced him, in appeal, to a life-sentence in 1995. Two years before, the Court of Cassation had quashed, on procedural grounds, the case against Battisti's alleged accomplice, accused by Pietro Mutti.[10]

Two of the assassinations occurred on February 16, 1979, one at Milan at 15h, and the other in Mestre, 270 km away from Milan, at 16h50. Battisti was sentenced for materially committing the first assassination, and for planning the second one.

[edit] Battisti's return to France

Ten years earlier, the President of France François Mitterrand had indicated that "leftist Italian activists who were not indicted for violent crimes and had given up terrorist activity would not be extradited to Italy"; this became known as the "Mitterrand doctrine". Many Italian political criminals had fled to France during the '70s-'80s. Trusting in this declaration, Battisti returned to France in 1990, where he was arrested on Italy's request in 1991, when his sentence was confirmed in the Court of Cassation. He thus passed five months in Fresnes prison, and then was freed after the extradition request was rejected by the Paris Appeal Court on May 29, 1991. French justice concluded that the anti-terrorist legislation enacted in Italy "went against the French principles of law," which, along with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), prohibited in particular to extradite a person sentenced in absentia if that person had not been in a condition to adequately defend himself during his trial.[13]

After his release, Battisti, in 1991, lived in Paris, where he wrote his first novel, Les Habits d'ombre ("Shadow clothes"). Two thrillers, L'Ombre rouge ("Red shadow") and Buena onda, took as backdrop the Parisian world of Italian fugitives from justice. Another major novel, titled Dernières cartouches ("Last bullets"), takes place in Italy during the "years of lead".

In 1997, jointly with other left-wing Italians who had fled to France and were accused of taking part in violent crimes, he asked without success the President of Italy at the time, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (DC) for an amnesty.

[edit] A diplomatic dispute between France and Italy

Over the years, Italy asked France several times to arrest and extradite left-wing Italians involved in court cases connected with political violence in Italy and who had fled to France. On September 11, 2002 Battisti's and others' extradition was again requested during the meeting in Paris between Italy's Minister of Justice Roberto Castelli and France's Minister of Justice Dominique Perben.

On February 10, 2004, the French government arrested Battisti on Italy's request and planned to extradite him to Italy. On June 30, 2004, the Paris Court of Appeal gave a favorable opinion for his extradition. An appeals in the Court of Cassation was filed against this opinion and another recourse introduced before the Conseil d'État against the extradition decree. President Jacques Chirac stated on July 2, 2004 that he would not oppose French justice's decision to extradite him. Perben confirmed Paris' new position: "There is no ambiguity. There has been a change of attitude from France, and I support it," (in reference to the "Mitterrand doctrine"), among other reasons "because of the European construction".[15][16]

As of 2007, only Paolo Persichetti, former member of the Unità Comuniste Combattenti, among the 200 Italians involved in Court cases dealing with political violence requested by Italy, was extradited (in August 2002). He was eventually sentenced to 22 years of prison. Minister Edouard Balladur had signed Persichetti's extradition decree in 1994; it was validated by the Conseil d'Etat the following year.[16] According to RFI radio station, the Perben-Castelli agreement was divided in three parts: all events before 1982 would be prescribed "except in case of exceptional gravity"; facts between 1982 and 1993 would be "examined on a case by case basis", in function of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) principle and of the "conditions in which the trials took place in Italy".

Still claiming his innocence, Cesare Battisti failed to check in at the local police station, while on parole, on August 21, 2004 and went under.

On March 18, 2005, the French Conseil d'Etat (the French Supreme Court in administrative law), ruling ultimately for Battisti's extradition, affirmed clearly that the Italian legislation did not conflict with the French principles of law. The Conseil established that:

the circumstance that some of the charges held against Mr Battisti, which led to the cited sentences, are partly based on statements by "repented" witnesses, is not contrary to French public order and does not constitute an infringement by Italian authorities of the requirements of Article 6 of the European Human Rights and fundamental liberties safeguard convention (...).[17]

ECtHR, then, confirmed those decisions and ruled that the Italian trial in absentia in Battisti's case was fair under its provisions.

Battisti fled to Brazil and was arrested in Rio de Janeiro on March 18, 2007.

[edit] The "Battisti affair"

As of 2007, Cesare Battisti denies having committed any of the murders he has been sentenced for.

Defenders of Battisti, among whom the Human Rights League (LDH), consider that France's decision to extradite Battisti was illegal, since Battisti would not have the right to a new trial, after having been judged in absentia.

But the alleged right to a new trial is not a sufficient guarantee for the defendant, as clearly ruled the ECtHR in the case of Krombach v. France, application no. 29731/96, and also article 6 of ECHR, the juridical ground of Battisti's claim against extradition, doesn't prescribe a new trial. ECHR establishes that there is not an absolute right to a new trial, after a trial in absentia. Battisti's claim concerned the defendant's knowledge of the trial, and Battisti's lawyers argued that the defendant had not been in a position to know that in Italy there was a trial against him and so his rights had been violated.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its December 2006 decision, rejected Battisti's claim that France's extradition decision was illegitimate. The Court considered that:

The applicant had patently been informed of the accusation against him and of the progress of the proceedings before the Italian courts, notwithstanding the fact that he had absconded. Furthermore, the applicant, who had deliberately chosen to remain on the run after escaping from prison, had received effective assistance during the proceedings from several lawyers specially appointed by him. Hence, the Italian and subsequently the French authorities had been entitled to conclude that the applicant had unequivocally waived his right to appear and be tried in person. The French authorities had therefore taken due account of all the circumstances of the case and of the Court’s case-law in granting the extradition request made by the Italian authorities: manifestly ill-founded.[18]

The circumstances of his sentence have been put in question. A movement claiming Battisti's innocence is active in the media and in public opinion (especially in France). Among the most vocal supporters of Battisti, writers Fred Vargas, Valerio Evangelisti and Bernard-Henri Lévy consider that the trials conducted in Italy were marked by irregularities. These alleged irregularities involved the use of torture (we must report that Battisti's French lawyers have not used this peculiar charge, the violation of article 3 ECHR, in their rejected claim to ECtHR), and the misuse of witnesses: according to Battisti's supporters, witnesses against Battisti were either affected by mental troubles, or were "collaboratori di giustizia", (that is, defendants testifying against other defendants in order to benefit from a reduced sentence. Those peculiar witnesses are also used by French justice, i.e. art. 132-78 French Code Penal). Battisti's supporters also claim that ballistic analysis and graphological expertises used in Italian court cases do in fact, contrary to what the Courts considered, exonerate Battisti.[10][19][20]

Most of public opinion in Italy disagrees with those views, and Battisti's arrest in Brazil has been commented upon favourably in the media. Rifondazione Comunista, however, considers that he should not be extradited, as he would not be granted the right to a new trial. In France, supporters of Battisti, such as Gilles Perrault, have called this arrest, a few weeks before the April 2007 presidential election, an "electoral feat," closely timed by the then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, candidate for the UMP conservative party. François Bayrou, candidate for the UDF right-of-center party, has called for a new trial, as have members of the left-wing.[13]

On 5 February 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it expressed its trust "that the re-examination of the decision on the extradition of Cesare Battisti will take into account the judgment delivered by an EU Member State in full compliance with the principle of the rule of law in the European Union"[7]

The Union syndicale des magistrats (USM, the largest trade union of French judges) has supported the fairness of the Italian trial in absentia and has also confirmed the legality of Battisti’s condemnation:[21]

"L'USM condamne le procédé consistent, dans une perspective purement idéologique, à discréditer une décision de justice rendue par une cour d’assises italienne, dans le strict respect des règles de procédure pénale (appel et cassation) s’agissant d’un accusé en fuite mais défendu à tous les stades de la procédure conformément au droit italien en vigueur."

Translation : "The USM condemns the procedure consisting in discrediting, in a purely ideological perspective, a justice decision emitted by an Italian Assizes Court, in strict respect of penal legal procedures (appeals and "Cassation"), in the case of a defendant not appearing in Court but defended in each and every stage of procedure in accordance with Italian prevailing legislation."

[edit] DSSA's attempt to kidnap Battisti?

In July 2005, the Italian press revealed the existence of the Department of Anti-terrorism Strategic Studies (DSSA), a "parallel police" created by Gaetano Saya, leader of Destra Nazionale neofascist party, and Riccardo Sindoca, two leaders of the National Union of the Police Forces (Unpf). Both claimed they were former members of Gladio, NATO's "stay-behind" paramilitary organization involved in Italy's strategy of tension and various alleged activist acts. According to Il Messaggero, quoted by The Independent, judicial sources declared that wiretaps suggested DSSA members had been planning to kidnap Cesare Battisti.[22]

[edit] Asylum in Brazil

The government of Brazil granted Cesare Battisti the status of political refugee through a decision of its Minister of Justice Tarso Genro. Battisti's request for asylum was first denied by the National Committee for Refugees, in a decision taken by simple majority. His defense appealed to the Minister of Justice, who granted in January 2009 refugee status, a decision which divided Brazilian public opinion.[23] Refugee status, however, halts the request for extradition, which is being considered by the Brazilian Supreme Court.

Italian President Giorgio Napolitano wrote to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, informing him of the "emotion and understandable reactions" raised in his country, in public opinion and among political forces, by this "grave decision". Italian Justice Minister, Angelino Alfano, has asked Brazilian authorities to reconsider this decision, "in the light of international cooperation against terrorism".[24] Lula answered Napolitano mentioning that Genro's decision is founded on the Brazilian constitution and on the UN 1951 Convention on Refugee Status, and is an act of sovereignty of Brazil.[25]

Criticism was also based on speculations about the influence exerted by Carla Bruni, spouse of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, on Genro's decision.[26] Brazilian Senator Eduardo Suplicy attested to Corriere della Sera that Bruni herself asked Lula to refuge Battisti. Bruni denied this claim on a RAI interview as she expressed her condolences with the families of Battisti's victims.[27]

Controversy surrounded Genro's decision on granting refugee status to Battisti. Many law specialists have spoken saying that the decision was illegal. The Brazilian Supreme Court started trying the case in September 2009. By 5 votes to 4 (simple majority), the court ruled Genro's decision null and void on 18 November. But the court also decided by 5 votes to 4 on the interpretation that the Brazilian constitution gives the president of the executive branch personal powers to deny the extradition if he choses to, effectively putting the final decision in the hands of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. On the 29th December 2010, unofficial reports in Italy and Brazil said President Lula was about to announce he had denied the extradition of Battisti, just 3 days short of ending his presidential mandate. The official announcement took place at December 31st, hours before President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's mandate conclusion. However,the final decision will be taken again by the Supreme Court in late February 2011.

[edit] Endnotes

  1. ^ Economist.com, The madness of asylum
  2. ^ Le Journal du Dimanche. 14/01/2008. Battisti: Brésil, terre d'asile.
  3. ^ Centro de Mídia Independente, 14.01.2009: Cesare Battisti conquista condição de refugiado político
  4. ^ Última Instância, revista jurídica. 21.012009. A Itália dos anos de chumbo e a questão do asilo político a Cesare Battisti
  5. ^ Folha de São Paulo, 14/01/2009. Comissão de Direitos Humanos diz que refúgio a Battisti segue a Constituição
  6. ^ Última Instância, revista jurídica. 21.012009. Ministério da Justiça recebe abaixo-assinado apoiando refúgio a Battisti
  7. ^ a b http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+20090205+TOC+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
  8. ^ Il Tempo
  9. ^ «La culpabilité de Battisti repose sur des preuves», interview with public prosecutor Armando Spataro, in L'Express, 15 March 2004 (French)
  10. ^ a b c Valerio Evangelisti, Valerio Evangelisti répond à 50 questions (French)
  11. ^ (Italian)Torregiani: A Cesare Battisti chiederei solo perche, 18/03/2007
  12. ^ Battisti persiste et signe, Guillame Perrault
  13. ^ a b c Cesare Battisti: dire la vérité, respecter les droits, Human Rights League (LDH), public statement of March 17, 2007 (French)
  14. ^ Via Libre 5, Cesare Battisti (dir.)
  15. ^ Richard Mallié, deputy of the Bouches-du-Rhône, Question au gouvernement: Extradition de Cesare Battisti, 26/10/2004 (French)
  16. ^ a b Clarisse Vernhes, « Paris prête à extrader d’autres «brigadistes», in RFI, 2002 (French)
  17. ^ "Considérant que la circonstance que certaines des charges retenues contre M. Battisti, et qui ont donné lieu aux condamnations précitées, reposent pour partie sur des déclarations de témoins " repentis ", n'est pas contraire à l'ordre public français et ne constitue pas une méconnaissance, par les autorités italiennes, des stipulations de l'article 6 de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (...)" Conseil d'Etat's http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld0515.shtml
  18. ^ European Court of Human Rights's decision (Sub art. 6, "claims inadmissible" : Life sentence following a conviction in absentia in "Battisti v. France," Information note n. 92)
  19. ^ Fred Vargas, « Cesare Battisti: A la recherche de la justice perdue » in La Règle du Jeu, n°30 (January 2006) (French)
  20. ^ Cesare Battisti, Ma Cavale, 27/4/2006, Preface p. 13 (French)
  21. ^ Communiqué USM Affaire Battisti in http://usm2000.free.fr/article.php3?id_article=142
  22. ^ Philips, John (2005-07-05). "Up to 200 Italian police 'ran parallel anti-terror force'". London: The Independent. http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article296897.ece. Retrieved April 28, 2010. (URL accessed on January 22, 2007)
  23. ^ http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u490815.shtml
  24. ^ Gazeta do Povo, 17/01/2009. Presidente da Itália manda "carta de pesar" a Lula pelo asilo a Battisti.
  25. ^ Folha de São Paulo. 23/01/2009. Leia íntegra da carta do presidente Lula enviada ao governo da Itália.
  26. ^ "Bruni denies asked Brazil not to extradite Italian". Reuters. January 25, 2009. http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE50O1ND20090125.
  27. ^ Folha de São Paulo. 25/01/2009. Carla Bruni nega participação em decisão brasileira de refugiar Battisti.

[edit] Bibliography

  • Travestito da uomo (French title: Les habits d'ombre)
  • Nouvel an, nouvelle vie (1994)
  • L'ombre rouge (Italian title: L'orma rossa; 1995)
  • Buena onda (1996)
  • Copier coller (1997)
  • J'auri ta Pau (1997)
  • L'ultimo sparo (French title: Dernières cartouches; 1998)
  • Naples (1999, short story anthology with works also by Jean-Jacques Busino, Carlo Lucarelli, Jean-Bernard Pouy and Tito Topin)
  • Jamais plus sans fusil (2000)
  • Terres brûlées (2000, editor)
  • Avenida Revolución (2001)
  • Le Cargo sentimental (2003)
  • Vittoria (2003)
  • L'eau du diamant (2006)
  • Ma cavale (2006)

[edit] External links



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